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WAL-MART STORES, INC. v. TEXAS ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE
COMMISSION: THE SUPREME COURT MISSES ITS “SHOT”
AT CLARIFYING STATE ALCOHOL REGULATIONS
AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
Josephine Battles*

INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court erred by denying certiorari in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Texas
Alcoholic Beverage Commission.1 The Texas statute that bans all publicly traded
corporations from obtaining a license to sell liquor, but carves an exception for some
Texas-run public corporations through an express clause, is in direct violation of the
dormant Commerce Clause.2 The Texas Legislature disguised the public corporation
ban as a “facially neutral” alcohol regulation, however, the ban is discriminatory
towards out-of-state competitors in both its purpose and effect.3 Moreover, the Fifth
Circuit’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores is firmly inconsistent with Supreme Court
precedent.4 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit has misapplied and misinterpreted case
precedent to generate an arbitrary per se rule for similarly situated businesses.5 The
interpretation used by the Fifth Circuit has created a circuit split for both state
alcohol regulations and the Commerce Clause more generally.6 The Supreme
Court’s ignorance of the errors committed by the Fifth Circuit in Wal-Mart Stores
has opened the door to constitutional, legislative, and economic harms.
Part I of this Note will discuss the interconnection between the Commerce
Clause and the Twenty-First Amendment. Part II will discuss the case history of
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission. Part III will argue
* JD Candidate, 2020, William & Mary Law School; BS, Missouri State University,
2019. I would first like to thank the members of the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
for their hard work to make this Note publication-ready. Next, a huge thank you to my parents.
Your constant love and support have made all my accomplishments possible. Lastly, this
Note would not have been successful without the support of my friends. Thank you all for
the advice, notes, guidance, calming reassurance, and your friendship during my journey
through law school.
1
945 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 874 (2020).
2
See discussion infra Section III.A.
3
See discussion infra Section III.B.
4
See discussion infra Section I.C, Part III. The decision is primarily inconsistent with
precedent set last term in Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct.
2449 (2019), but also with longstanding Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
5
See infra Section III.B.
6
See infra Section III.C.
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that the Supreme Court erred by denying certiorari in Wal-Mart Stores preview the
potential harms stemming from this decision.
I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause authorizes Congress “to regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with Indian Tribes.”7 As written, the
Commerce Clause is an express grant of power for Congress to regulate commerce
between the states.8 The dormant Commerce Clause, however, is “the negative implication of the Commerce Clause”9 that restricts the states from “imposing economic
protectionism” against other states.10 The dormant Commerce Clause enables the
federal courts to guard Congress’s power to regulate commerce11 and prevents states
from enacting laws “designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening
out-of-state competitors.”12
Though dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence has evolved significantly
during its two-hundred-year history in the Supreme Court,13 several principles have
remained consistent.14 First, obvious discrimination against interstate commerce is
presumptively invalid and can only be upheld if the discrimination is necessary to
meet an important state interest.15 Second, state regulations where burdens on interstate commerce clearly outweigh legitimate local benefits are unconstitutional.16
State regulations are subject to two types of challenges under the dormant Commerce
7

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Pamela R. Cote, Note, Constitutional Law—The ‘Grape’ March on Washington: The
Twenty-First Amendment, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and Direct Alcohol Shipments,
26 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 343, 345 (2004).
9
Lisa Lucas, Comment, A New Approach to the Wine Wars: Reconciling the Twenty-First
Amendment with the Commerce Clause, 52 UCLA L. REV. 899, 910–11 (2005). The dormant
Commerce Clause is an implied, rather than express, power.
10
Cote, supra note 8, at 346.
11
Jason E. Prince, Note, New Wine in Old Wineskins: Analyzing State Direct-Shipment
Laws in the Context of Federalism, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and the Twenty-First
Amendment, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1563, 1569 (2004).
12
Tania K. M. Lex, Note, Of Wine and War: The Fall of State Twenty-First Amendment
Power at the Hands of the Dormant Commerce Clause—Granholm v. Heald, 32 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 1145, 1149 (2006) (quoting 15A AM. JUR. 2D Commerce § 1 (2005)) (internal quotation omitted).
13
Cote, supra note 8, at 346.
14
Lucas, supra note 9, at 911.
15
Id. Since the 1930s, the Court has recognized the states’ authority to enact legislation
for the health and safety of its citizens. Cote, supra note 8, at 346.
16
Lucas, supra note 9, at 911.
8
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Clause—facial challenges and challenges to statutes “as applied.”17 The first prong
of the dormant Commerce Clause analysis is to consider whether the “statute ‘directly
regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce’ or ‘favor[s] in-state economic
interests over out-of-state interests.”18 A statute that falls within this description is
presumptively invalid19 unless it necessarily serves a “legitimate local purpose.”20
The second prong of the analysis is a fact-intensive inquiry into the justifications of
the discriminatory nature and effect of the statute.21 In most cases, the two prong
Commerce Clause analysis is sufficient. The Twenty-First Amendment, however,
complicates the dormant Commerce Clause by adding a third prong to the analysis.22
The third prong determines whether a statute is “saved” by Section 2 of the TwentyFirst Amendment.23 A brief history on the passage and subsequent jurisprudence of
the Twenty-First Amendment is helpful in understanding this additional prong of the
Commerce Clause analysis.
B. The Twenty-First Amendment
1. The History of Prohibition and Repeal
In 1920, the United States began a national prohibition with the passage of the
Eighteenth Amendment which forbade the “manufacture, sale, or transportation of
intoxicating liquors.”24 However, this experimental prohibition was short-lived due
to non-compliance.25 As social and economic conditions worsened from the Great
Depression and non-compliance with prohibition, the motivation to end the unsuccessful experiment increased.26
17

Id.
Id. (quoting Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573,
579 (1986)).
19
Id. Statutes facing a facial challenge will always fit into this category. See id. at 912.
20
Id. at 911. To be upheld, the legitimate local purpose “cannot be adequately served by
reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.” Id. at 911–12.
21
Id. at 912. “[A]t this stage states are required to justify the discriminatory nature of the
statute, which can be a significant hurdle to overcome.” Id.
22
Id. at 913.
23
See id.
24
Elizabeth Norton, Note, The Twenty-First Amendment in the Twenty-First Century:
Reconsidering State Liquor Controls in Light of Granholm v. Heald, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1465,
1468 (2006); U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1; Lex, supra note 12, at 1152.
25
See Brannon P. Denning, Smokey and the Bandit in Cyberspace: The Dormant Commerce Clause, the Twenty-First Amendment, and State Regulation of Internet Alcohol Sales,
19 CONST. COMMENT. 297, 303 (2002). Legislatures refused to allocate resources to enforce
compliance with the amendment. Id.
26
Norton, supra note 24, at 1470. Criminal rackets increased as people tried to illegally
satisfy the demands for alcohol. Denning, supra note 25, at 303.
18
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In 1932, Franklin D. Roosevelt won the presidency, running on an anti-prohibition platform.27 Within a month of the election, a resolution to repeal the Eighteenth
Amendment was introduced to the House.28 Two months later, in February 1933, the
Senate produced and passed a revised resolution that ended prohibition and gave
states control of liquor regulation through Section Two of the Twenty-First Amendment.29 Ratification of the Amendment, and the end of prohibition, was complete by
December 1933.30
2. Section Two of the Twenty-First Amendment
Prior to prohibition, Congress granted the states the ability to regulate alcohol
in interstate commerce through the Webb-Kenyon Act.31 “The Act prohibited any
importation, manufacture, or sale of alcohol in violation of state law.”32 The Act was
designed to give states a pass around the dormant Commerce Clause.33 The TwentyFirst Amendment adopted similar language in Section 2 to give states the authority
to regulate interstate liquor.34
Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment reads: “The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use
therein of intoxicating liquors, in violations of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.”35 This language traditionally gave states the broad discretion to regulate
alcohol.36 However, as state alcohol regulations began to intertwine with traditional
Commerce Clause regulations, the Court recognized the need to separate these
rights.37 Modern Section 2 cases fall within three separate categories.38
27

Cote, supra note 8, at 352.
Norton, supra note 24, at 1470. The resolution was introduced to the House on
December 5, 1932. Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 1471.
32
Drew D. Massey, Dueling Provisions: The 21st Amendment’s Subjugation to the Dormant
Commerce Clause Doctrine, 7 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 71, 78 (2005).
33
See id.
34
See id.
35
U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
36
See generally State Bd. of Equalization v. Young’s Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59 (1936) (States
may prohibit the importation of liquors as long as it prohibits manufacture and sale of liquors
within its own borders); Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm’n, 305 U.S. 391
(1939) (the Commerce Clause does not restrict the right of the states to regulate or prohibit
alcohol); Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401 (1938) (states could discriminate
in favor of in-state-manufactured liquor against out-of-state liquor).
37
See Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324–25, 332 (1964). “Both
the Twenty-[F]irst Amendment and the Commerce Clause are parts of the same Constitution.
Like other provisions of the Constitution, each must be considered in the light of the other,
and in the context of the issues and interests at stake in any concrete case.” Id. at 332.
38
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 486 (2005).
28
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First, state alcohol regulations “that violate other provisions of the Constitution
are not saved by the Twenty-first Amendment.”39 This has been applied to provisions like the Establishment Clause,40 the Equal Protection Clause,41 and the First
Amendment.42 Second, Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment does not override
Congress’s Commerce Clause powers regarding alcohol.43 Just because states have
the right to regulate alcohol does not mean alcohol is outside of the confines of
Congress’s power to regulate commerce.44 Third, state alcohol regulations are
“limited by the nondiscrimination principle of the Commerce Clause.”45 When states
directly regulate against interstate commerce or when the effects favor in-state
economic interests at the expense of out-of-state actors, those regulations are “generally struck down . . . without further inquiry.”46
To survive modern Section 2 analysis, a regulation must “be justified as a public
health or safety measure or on some other legitimate nonprotectionist ground.”47
Moreover, though Section 2 gives states greater regulatory authority for alcohol
regulation, “‘mere speculation’” and “‘unsupported assertions’” cannot justify a regulation that otherwise violates the Commerce Clause.48 Regulations with the predominant effect of protectionism, not public health or safety, are not saved by Section 2
39

Id. “Saved” meaning that the Twenty-First Amendment supersedes the Commerce
Clause. See id. at 476.
40
See generally Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (A Massachusetts
statute that allowed the governing bodies of churches and schools to “prevent issuance of
liquor licenses for premises within a 500-foot radius of the church or school by objecting the
license application” was unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause).
41
See generally Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (An Oklahoma statute that allowed
women to purchase certain beer at age 18 but prohibited men under age 21 from purchasing
the same beer was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause).
42
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 486–87; see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S.
484 (1996) (Rhode Island’s total ban on price advertising for alcoholic beverages violated
the First Amendment).
43
See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 487. See generally Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467
U.S. 691 (1984); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S.
97 (1980).
44
See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 487; Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. 377
U.S. 324, 332 (1964). “Though the Court’s language in Hostetter may have come uncommonly
close to hyperbole in describing this argument as ‘an absurd oversimplification,’ ‘patently
bizarre,’ and ‘demonstrably incorrect,’ the basic point was sound.” Granholm, 544 U.S. at
487 (internal citations omitted).
45
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 487 (citing Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 at 276;
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573 (1986); Healy
v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324 (1989)).
46
Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State
Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986)).
47
See Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2474 (2019).
48
Id. (citing Granholm, 544 U.S. at 490, 492).
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of the Twenty-First Amendment.49 The need to justify on nonprotectionist grounds
makes the Section 2 analysis of alcohol regulations one with “teeth.”50 This analysis
has shaped the modern jurisprudence concerning state alcohol regulations and the
Commerce Clause.
C. The Connection Between Alcohol Regulations and the Commerce Clause
Section 2 and the Commerce Clause have intermingled since the ratification of
the Twenty-First Amendment. A brief synopsis of modern landmark cases reveals
the Court’s interpretation of Section 2 regulations that conflict with the Commerce
Clause. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. V. Dias formally established that state alcohol regulations were not shielded by Section 2 by virtue of being alcohol regulations.51 Granholm
v. Heald addressed the health and safety concerns, and other legitimate interests, that
led to modern Section 2 analysis for alcohol regulations.52 Lastly, in Tennessee Wine
and Spirits Retailers Association v. Thomas, the Court “reiterate[d] that the Commerce Clause by its own force restricts state protectionism.”53 Moreover, it held that
it is a violation of the Commerce Clause when the “predominant effect” of a state
regulation is “simply to protect” in-state business “from out-of-state competition.”54
The analysis used in Tennessee Wine is critical to understanding the Supreme Court’s
mistake in denying certiorari in Wal-Mart Stores.
1. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias
In 1939, Hawaii imposed a twenty percent excise tax on the sale of wholesale
liquor.55 However, in 1971, the state exempted okoleaho (a brandy made from “the
root of . . . an indigenous shrub of Hawaii”) and a Hawaiian fruit wine manufacturer
from this tax “to encourage the development of the Hawaiian liquor industry.”56 The
Court found that the tax exemption for the fruit wine and okoleaho had a discriminatory purpose and effect in favor of local products.57 The exempted beverages did not
pose a “competitive threat” to other liquors because they comprised a small portion
49

Id.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 945 F.3d 206, 213 (5th
Cir. 2019).
51
See 468 U.S. 263 (1984) (State alcohol regulations may be saved by Section 2 if they
serve a legitimate interest supported by the Twenty-First Amendment).
52
See 544 U.S. 460, 463 (2005) (States must overcome Commerce Clause violations by
showing their alcohol regulations advance a legitimate interest, like health and safety, that
cannot be obtained by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives).
53
139 S. Ct. 2449, 2461 (2019).
54
Id. at 2476.
55
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 263, 265 (1984).
56
Id. at 265.
57
Id. at 268–73.
50
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of total liquor sales in Hawaii.58 Nevertheless, the Court still found some competition, and, therefore, discriminatory effect between the in-state exempted beverages
and out-of-state nonexempted beverages.59 The Court also noted that legislative
intent to aid locally produced beverages, rather than to harm out-of-state producers,
is irrelevant to the Commerce Clause inquiry.60
The state of Hawaii argued that the tax exemption was “saved” by Section 2 of
the Twenty-First Amendment.61 The Court held that the tax exemption was not
saved by Section 2 of Twenty-First Amendment because it was enacted to promote
local industry, not to “promote temperance or to carry out any other purpose of the
Twenty-first Amendment.”62 The Court made clear that state laws amounting to
“mere economic protectionism” should not be afforded the same deference as laws
“enacted to combat the perceived evils of an unrestricted traffic in liquor.”63
2. Granholm v. Heald
This action stemmed from Michigan and New York alcohol regulatory schemes
that allowed for in-state wineries to make direct sales to consumers but prohibited
out-of-state wineries from doing the same.64 The Michigan system allowed for instate wineries to sell directly to consumers if they met the state’s licensing requirement.65 However, out-of-state wineries faced a complete ban on shipment, regardless
of their licensure.66 The New York system required out-of-state wineries to establish
a distribution operation in New York to access direct shipment—indirectly subjecting those wineries to a three-tiered system.67 Many states employ a three-tiered
distribution system that requires separate licenses for producers, wholesalers, and
retailers.68 New York’s three-tiered system required out-of-state wineries to open a
warehouse and branch office within the state to establish a distribution operation.69
58

Id. at 263, 269.
Id. at 263 (“As long as there is some competition between the exempt beverages and
nonexempt product from outside the State, there is a discriminatory effect.”).
60
Id. at 264 (stating that economic protectionism does not hinge on “characterizing the
industry in question as ‘thriving’ or ‘struggling’” nor on legislative intent).
61
Id.
62
Id. at 276 (the State “acknowledges that the purpose was to ‘promote a local industry’”).
63
Id.
64
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 460 (2005).
65
Id. at 473–74.
66
Id. The system required “all out-of-state wine, but not all in-state wine, to pass through
an in-state wholesaler and retailer before reaching consumers.” Id. at 474.
67
Id.
68
See id. at 466. States have the authority to mandate a three-tiered distribution system
under the authority granted by the Twenty-First Amendment. North Dakota v. United States,
495 U.S. 423, 433 (1990).
69
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 474–75. This requirement adds additional costs to the sale of
their wines. Id.
59
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The Court held that “New York’s in-state presence requirement runs contrary to
[the] admonition that States cannot require an out-of-state firm ‘to become a resident
in order to compete on equal terms.’”70 Moreover, even if out-of-state wineries
established the in-state presence requirement for distribution, they were still ineligible
for the “farm winery license” that provided the best direct shipping method to New
York consumers.71
The Court held that these laws faced “‘a virtually per se rule of invalidity’”
because they discriminated against interstate commerce.72 The Court reached this
decision following two lines of precedent. First, Commerce Clause jurisprudence
has “prevented States from discriminating against imported liquor.”73 Second, states
cannot pass facially neutral laws that cause an impermissible burden on interstate
commerce.74 Moreover, Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment did not shield
these regulations from the Commerce Clause.75
States can overcome Commerce Clause violations through Section 2 of the
Twenty-First Amendment by showing that the alcohol regulation “advances a
legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.”76 Michigan and New York advanced “keeping alcohol out of
the hands of minors and facilitating tax collection” as the main justifications for
their regulations.77 The Court found these justifications insufficient to justify the
discrimination against out-of-state wineries.78 First, the States offered little evidence
to prove there was a problem involving minors purchasing wine over the internet.79
Second, while tax collection is a legitimate concern, the States can achieve that
objective “without discriminating against interstate commerce.”80 In addition to the
70

Id. at 475 (quoting Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 72 (1963)).
Id.
72
See id. at 476 (citing Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978)).
73
Id. at 476–77 (citing Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58 (1897); Walling v. Michigan, 116
U.S. 446 (1886); Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 U.S. 123 (1880)).
74
Id. at 477 (citing Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412 (1898); Vance v. W.A. Vandercook Co.,
170 U.S. 438 (1898); Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890); Bowman v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co.,
125 U.S. 465 (1888)).
75
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 476 (“The States’ position is inconsistent with our precedents
and with the Twenty-[F]irst Amendment’s history.”).
76
Id. at 489 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach,
486 U.S. 269, 278 (1998)).
77
Id.
78
Id. at 490–91. To overcome a Commerce Clause violation, concrete record evidence
must prove that “a State’s nondiscriminatory alternatives will prove unworkable.” Id. at 493;
see, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 142–44 (1986).
79
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 490. Minors are less likely to purchase wine than other intoxicating beverages. See id. Moreover, minors who wish to consume alcohol underage have
more direct means of obtaining alcohol that satisfies their desire for instant gratification. See id.
80
Id. at 491. For example, New York “protect[s] itself against lost tax revenue . . .” with
in-state wineries “by requiring a permit as a condition of direct shipping.” Id. The Court argues
this method could be used for out-of-state wineries as well. Id.
71
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two main justifications for the regulations, New York and Michigan offered several
other rationales the Court believed could be achieved through nondiscriminatory
practices.81 While summarizing the lack of evidence-based justifications provided
by the States, the Court declared, “[o]ur Commerce Clause cases demand more than
mere speculation to support discrimination against out-of-state goods.”82 In fact, to
overcome allegations of Commerce Clause violations, states must offer “concrete
record evidence” that “nondiscriminatory alternatives will prove unworkable.”83 The
Court ultimately held:
States have broad power to regulate liquor under § 2 of the
Twenty-first Amendment. This power, however, does not allow
States to ban, or severely limit, the direct shipment of out-ofstate wine while simultaneously authorizing direct shipment by
in-state producers. If a State chooses to allow direct shipment of
wine, it must do so on evenhanded terms. Without demonstrating the need for discrimination, New York and Michigan have
enacted regulations that disadvantage out-of-state wine producers.
Under our Commerce Clause jurisprudence, these regulations
cannot stand.84
The Court’s clear and powerful decision in Granholm has since guided modern
Section 2 analysis.85
D. Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Association v. Thomas
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Association
v. Thomas is a recent example of the Court’s rejection of state alcohol regulations
in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.86 In a 7–2 opinion,87 the Supreme
Court held that Tennessee’s durational residency requirements for companies and
persons wishing to operate a retail liquor store were unconstitutional violations of
the Commerce Clause.88
81

Id. at 492 (“[F]acilitating orderly market conditions, protecting public health and safety,
and ensuring regulatory accountability” through an “an evenhanded licensing requirement.”).
82
Id. at 492.
83
Id. at 492–93 (citing Taylor, 477 U.S. at 141–44).
84
Id. at 493.
85
See, e.g., Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (2019)
(Granholm is cited throughout the opinion).
86
See generally id.
87
Id. at 2456 (Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, Ginsburg,
Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Kavanaugh joined).
88
Id. at 2453.
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Like many states, Tennessee employed a three-tiered system for alcohol distribution.89 To obtain a retailer’s license, Tennessee placed durational residency requirements on applicants.90 The main requirements can be broken down into three
separate issues. First, to obtain an initial license to operate a liquor store, a person
was required to prove they had been a “bona fide resident” of Tennessee for two
years.91 Second, the initial license had to be renewed after one year of operation and
licensees had to demonstrate a ten-year consecutive residency in Tennessee to
qualify for renewal.92 Third, corporations could not obtain a retail liquor license
unless all directors, officers, and owners of capital satisfied “the durational-residency
requirements applicable to individuals.”93
In 2012, the Tennessee attorney general recognized the unconstitutional nature
of the regulations and ceased enforcement until the General Assembly amended the
laws to include a statement of legislative intent that claimed the regulations were
enacted to increase management and control of alcohol suppliers and to protect the
health and safety of Tennessee residents.94 In 2016, two retailers, neither of which
satisfied the residency requirements, applied for a retailer’s license through the
Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission (TABC).95 The TABC recommended
approval of the application, as the residency requirements were no longer being
enforced.96 The Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Association (the Association)
threatened to sue if the TABC granted the new retailers a license against the durational
residency requirements.97 Thomas, the Executive Director of the TABC, sought declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of Tennessee’s residency requirements.98
The Sixth Circuit invalidated all three provisions.99 The petitioners only challenged the two-year durational requirement before the Supreme Court.100 The Court
89

See id. at 2457; see also Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 466–67 (2005) (explanation
of the three-tiered system).
90
Tennessee Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2457.
91
Id. (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-3-204(b)(2)(A) (2018)).
92
Id. (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-3-204(b)(2)(A) (2018)). Initial applicants had to prove
a two-year residency and then prove a ten-year residency the very next year to renew their
license. See id. While many in the legal community may joke that “most lawyers are pretty
bad at math,” there is a clear mathematical disconnect between the initial license requirement
and renewal requirement. Ed Walters, The Tyranny of Hunches: Using Analytics to Give
Your Firm a Strategic Advantage, 90 FLA. B.J. 46, 47 (2016).
93
Tennessee Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2457 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-3-204(b)(3)). In
practice, publicly traded corporations could not operate a liquor store in Tennessee. Id.
94
Id. at 2457–58.
95
Id. at 2458.
96
See id.
97
See id.
98
Id. at 2458.
99
Id. at 2457–58 (the panel was divided on the two-year residency-requirement question
but unanimously struck down the other two provisions).
100
Id. at 2457.
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held that the durational residency requirement violated the Commerce Clause101 and
was not shielded by the Twenty-First Amendment.102
The dissenting Justices agreed with the Association’s argument that the two-year
residency requirement should have been “shielded” by Section 2 of the Twenty-First
Amendment.103 Although the Association conceded that Section 2 does not allow
states the right to discriminate against products and producers of out-of-state alcohol,
they claimed that a different rule applied to in-state alcohol distribution.104 The Court
found this claimed distinction baseless.105 Additionally, the Association argued that
the history of Section 2 displayed an intent to broadly exempt “in-state distribution
laws from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny.”106 However, this only accounts for
laws passed shortly after the end of prohibition and does not consider the jurisprudence that has flowed from the history of state alcohol regulations in violation of the
Commerce Clause.107
The Court analyzed the Association’s claims using modern Section 2 precedent.108
To overcome a Commerce Clause violation, the alcohol regulation must be enacted
as a health or safety provision, or for some other legitimate, non-protectionist purpose,
that could not be achieved through nondiscriminatory alternatives.109 The Association advanced three main arguments to justify the two-year residency requirement
as a legitimate health and safety regulation.110 First, the Association argued that “the
requirement ensures that retailers are ‘amenable to the direct process of state courts.’”111
However, the Association did not demonstrate why the objective could not have
been satisfied by readily available alternatives like consenting to suit in Tennessee
courts or appointing an in-state agent to receive process.112
Second, the Association asserted that the residency requirements would give
Tennessee a better chance to assess an applicant’s fitness to sell alcohol and “guard[]
against ‘undesirable nonresidents’” moving to the state to sell liquor.113 The Court
101

Id. at 2457, 2462 (“Tennessee’s 2-year durational-residency requirement plainly favors
Tennesseans over nonresidents . . . .”).
102
Id. at 2457.
103
See id. at 2469.
104
See id. at 2470–71.
105
Id. at 2471 (finding that Granholm did not limit its holding to products and producers.).
106
Id. at 2472.
107
Id.; see supra notes 37–42 and accompanying text.
108
See Tennessee Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2469. The Court recognized that the requirement was
subject to special analysis under Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment because it dealt
with state alcohol regulation. Had the requirement only been subject to standard Commerce
Clause analysis, it could not apply to any retail business because it was facially discriminatory
against out-of-state businesses. Id. at 2474.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 2474–75.
111
Id. at 2475.
112
Id. (citing Cooper v. McBeath, 11 F.3d 547, 554 (5th Cir. 1994)).
113
Id.
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cited multiple reasons to find the Association’s claim unpersuasive.114 Most importantly, the Court pointed toward Fifth Circuit precedent that reinforced a state’s right
to thoroughly scrutinize applicants by nondiscriminatory means.115 Moreover, the Court
noted that Tennessee could easily maintain oversight over liquor stores without the
residency requirement because the stores were physically located within the state.116
Third, the Association claimed the two-year residency requirement promoted
responsible alcohol consumption.117 The Association argued that requiring residency
would lead to responsible sales practices because the retailer would be more likely
to be familiar with the community they serve.118 The Association offered no evidence
to prove that residency requirements produce responsible sales practices.119 Moreover, the residency requirement only applied to the retailer who held the license, not
the employees making the sales.120 Ultimately, the Court found the residency requirement to have “at best a highly attenuated relationship to public health or safety.”121
Not only must a state advance a legitimate purpose for discriminatory regulations, they must also prove that their objectives could not be met by nondiscriminatory alternatives.122 Here, the Court listed “obvious” nondiscriminatory alternatives
to the two-year residency requirement that “better serve [the state’s] goal[s].”123 For
example, the Court suggested, limiting the amount of alcohol and the number of
retail licenses that may be sold to an individual, mandating training on responsible
alcohol sales for managers and employees, mandating employees and managers to
have an adequate connection and knowledge of the local community, and monitoring retail practices to “take action against those who violate the law.”124
In closing the opinion, the Court declared, “[i]n light of this history and our
established case law, we reiterate that the Commerce Clause by its own force restricts
114

Tennessee Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2475. The state requires background checks on all applicants. Id. The TBAC would not necessarily know that a new resident moved to the state with
the intent to apply for a liquor license after two years, so it does not save any investigation
time. Id.
115
Id. (citing Cooper, 11 F.3d at 554).
116
Id.; cf. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 492 (2005) (the Court found the States’
argument that out-of-state retailers could not adequately monitored insufficient because of
advancements in technology).
117
Tennessee Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2475.
118
Id. at 2475–76. The “responsible neighborhood proprietor” would cut off sales to people
who appear to abuse alcohol or are known in the community to abuse alcohol. Id. at 2476.
119
Id.
120
Id. Also, the requirement is only for residency—alcohol safety courses and trainings
are not required in the two-year period. See id.
121
Id. at 2474.
122
See, e.g., Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 463 (2005); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S.
131, 141–44 (1986).
123
Tennessee Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2476.
124
Id.
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state protectionism.”125 Moreover, the Court clearly established that state alcohol
regulations with the “predominant effect” of protecting in-state retailers from “outof-state competition” was an unconstitutional violation of the Commerce Clause.126
II. THE HISTORY OF WAL-MART V. TEXAS ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE COMMISSION
This Note argues that the Supreme Court erred by denying certiorari in WalMart Stores. The Fifth Circuit’s decision was firmly inconsistent with the Court’s
recent decision in Tennessee Wine and Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Moreover,
the denial of certiorari may lead to constitutional, legislative, and economic harms.
A brief synopsis of the case’s journey is helpful to evaluate why the Supreme Court
should have granted certiorari.
A. The District Court Decision
In 2018, Wal-Mart challenged a Texas statute that regulated the issuance of
“package store” or “P permits” which authorize the retail sale of liquor within the
state.127 Specifically, Wal-Mart challenged Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code § 22.16,
which prohibits public corporations from obtaining P permits, as an unconstitutional
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.128 An express clause in the statute allows
corporations that obtained permits before 1995 to be grandfathered in.129 The issue
with this provision is that only Texas-owned companies could have obtained the
permits before 1995, because Texas enforced unconstitutional residency requirements
for licensure until 2007.130
The district court found the ban unduly burdensome on commerce and intentionally discriminatory against out-of-state actors.131 To analyze discriminatory purpose, the
court applied the four-factor Arlington Heights132 analysis.133 The four factors include:
(1) whether there is a clear pattern of discrimination; (2) the decision’s historical
background, including a history of discrimination by law makers; (3) the sequence
of events directing the challenged decision; and (4) the administrative or legislative
125

Id. at 2461.
Id. at 2476 (emphasis added).
127
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 945 F.3d 206, 210–11
(5th Cir. 2019). In total, four statutes were challenged, including TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN.
§§ 22.04, 22.05, 22.06, 22.16. However, only § 22.16 is within the scope of this Note.
128
Id. at 211. Petitioners raised an Equal Protection concern that was rejected by both the
district and circuit court. Id.
129
See TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 22.16(f).
130
Wal-Mart Stores, 945 F.3d at 214 (Durational residency requirements were repealed in
1994, but Texas continued to enforce them until enjoined by a federal district court in 2007).
131
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 313 F. Supp. 3d 751, 767
(W.D. Tex. 2018).
132
See generally Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
133
Wal-Mart Stores, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 767.
126
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history of the state action, “including contemporary statements by decisionmakers.”134
Here, the district court found “all four Arlington Heights factors demonstrate[d] that
the purpose of the ban was to discriminate against out-of-state companies.”135
First, the ban showed a clear pattern of discrimination by essentially “barring
nearly all out-of-state companies with the scale and capabilities necessary to serve the
Texas retail liquor market.”136 As evidence, more than ninety-eight percent of package
stores and package store companies in Texas are Texas-owned.137 Furthermore, since
ending enforcement of the unconstitutional residency requirements on companies,
“only one significant out-of-state company has entered the Texas market.”138
Second, Texas has demonstrated an “undeniable ‘history of discrimination by
the decision-making body.’”139 After the Fifth Circuit found residency requirements
to be unconstitutional violations of the Commerce Clause in 1994, Texas continued
to enforce those requirements on package stores for another twelve years.140
Third, “the proximate cause of the Legislature’s decision to enact the public
corporation ban was the Fifth Circuit’s decision invalidating the residency requirement.”141 The decision in Cooper v. McBeath142 drove the passage of the public
corporation ban, as the Legislature wanted to strike a deal to prevent a “broad ruling
that would jeopardize the enforceability of all its residency requirements.”143 Once
the Fifth Circuit found residency requirements to be unconstitutional violations of the
Commerce Clause in Cooper,144 the Texas legislature “enacted the public corporation ban in the very next session.”145
Fourth, the legislative history included “direct evidence of discriminatory purpose.”146 For example, the bill’s drafter testified that the motivation for the public
corporation ban was to “preserve the ‘stable business climate’ created by the residency
requirement.”147 Even more troublesome were the Senate sponsor’s remarks that the
134

Id. (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 495 F.3d 151 (5th Cir. 2007)).
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Wal-Mart Stores, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 767.
140
Id. Texas only ended the enforcement of the residency requirements after being “permanently enjoined by a federal district court.” Id. (citing Wine & Spirits of Tex., Inc. v. Steen,
486 F. Supp. 2d 626, 633 (W.D. Tex. 2007)).
141
Id.
142
See 11 F.3d 547, 548 (5th Cir. 1994) (residency requirements “amount to simple economic
protectionism” and therefore violate the Commerce Clause).
143
Wal-Mart Stores, 313 F. Supp. 3d 751, 767–68 (W.D. Tex. 2018). After failing to strike
a deal with Cooper, the Texas legislature passed the ban in the next legislative session. Id.
144
See Cooper, 11 F.3d at 555–56 (“The discriminatory three-year residency requirement
inherent in the challenged statutory provisions cannot stand.”).
145
Wal-Mart Stores, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 768.
146
Id. (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 495 F.3d 151, 160 (5th Cir. 2007)).
147
Id.
135
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public corporation ban was designed to guarantee that “somebody from Texas” owned
package stores and to ensure that “you can’t have a package store inside a WalMart.”148 These statements led the court to believe that the Legislature’s purpose in
adopting the public corporation ban was to prevent “out-of-state companies from
entering the market.”149
After a careful analysis of the four Arlington Heights factors, the court determined that the public corporation ban had a discriminatory purpose to protect locally
owned stores against out-of-state corporations.150 Furthermore, the court supported
its finding with evidence that the Texas Package Store Association (TPSA) made
expressly discriminatory arguments while lobbying against the repeal of the ban.151
Relying on the “[t]he Legislature’s discriminatory purpose in enacting the public
corporation ban,” the district court used strict scrutiny to analyze the statute.152 The
Fifth Circuit has repeatedly triggered strict scrutiny analysis for such cases.153
Moreover, various federal appeals courts have found a statute in violation of the
dormant Commerce Clause based on discriminatory purpose alone.154 Under strict
scrutiny, a discriminatory regulation is valid only if the “state ‘can demonstrate,
under rigorous scrutiny, that it has no other means to advance a legitimate local
interest.’”155 Because neither the TABC nor the TPSA could satisfy the burden, the
district court concluded that the public corporation ban violated the dormant Commerce Clause.156
Although the district court found that the “public corporation ban was enacted
with discriminatory purpose,” it did not find discriminatory effect when applying
Fifth Circuit precedent.157 The district court relied on Exxon Corp. v. Governor of
148

Id.
Id.
150
Id.
151
Wal-Mart Stores, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 768. Lobbying handouts from TPSA boasted that
“all 2,300 liquor stores in the state are still owned by Texas residents” because of “the prohibition in the Code against a corporation with more than 35 shareholders.” Id.
152
Id. at 769.
153
See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 495 F.3d 151, 160 (5th Cir. 2007); Bacchus Imports,
Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984); Int’l Truck & Engine Corp. v. Bray, 372 F.3d 717,
725 (5th Cir. 2004); Churchill Downs Inc. v. Trout, 589 Fed. App’x 233, 234 (5th Cir. 2014).
154
See, e.g., South Dakota Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine, 340 F.3d 583, 596 (8th Cir.
2003) (“Because we conclude that Amendment E was motivated by a discriminatory purpose,
we must strike it down as unconstitutional . . . .”); Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore,
252 F.3d 316, 345 (4th Cir. 2001) (No deference was given to Virginia’s General Assembly
after a finding of discriminatory purpose because “[s]uch a discriminatory purpose wholly
undercuts the notion that Virginia’s political process served as a check against unduly
burdensome regulations.”).
155
Wal-Mart Stores, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 769 (quoting Allstate, 495 F.3d at 160).
156
Id.
157
Id. at 772–73.
149
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Maryland,158 Ford Motor Co. v. Texas Department of Transportation,159 and Allstate
Insurance Co. v. Abbott,160 when analyzing the discriminatory effect of the ban.161 In
summarizing the precedents, the court determined that unless a law differentiates
between similarly situated in-state and out-of-state companies based on their ties to
the state, that law cannot discriminate in effect.162 The court reasoned that because
public corporations were banned from obtaining P permits “whether or not they are
based in Texas or owned by Texans” the ban did not treat similarly situated companies differently.163
Although the court found no discriminatory effect, it nevertheless invalidated
the ban because its local benefits were significantly outweighed by the burdens
placed on interstate commerce.164 The court reached its decision using the Pike165
balancing test.166
The Pike balancing test has three steps. First, a court must determine whether the challenged regulation incidentally burdens
interstate commerce. Second, a court asks whether the regulation
has “putative local benefits.” Finally, the court must weigh the
local benefits of the regulation against the burdens the regulation
places on interstate commerce.167
Laws evaluated under the Pike test are to be upheld unless the burden on commerce
is “clearly excessive” when balanced with local benefits.168 The court determined the
public corporation ban failed the Pike balancing test.169
158

See generally 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (A ban on oil refiners owning retail gas stations was
upheld because the ban did not distinguish between out-of-state and in-state companies in
the market).
159
See generally 264 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2001) (In order to have a discriminatory effect,
a law must provide a deferential treatment based on state contacts).
160
See generally 495 F.3d 151 (5th Cir. 2007) (a law banning auto insurers from operating
and owning auto body shops was not a violation of the Commerce Clause relying on Exxon).
161
Wal-Mart Stores, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 772.
162
Id.
163
Id. Additionally, the court bolstered their reasoning with the fact that companies with
fewer than thirty-five shareholders could obtain a permit whether or not they are based in
Texas and that one out-of-state company had successfully established business in Texas. Id.
164
Id. at 778.
165
See generally Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
166
Wal-Mart Stores, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 773 (“Pike provides a standard for assessing state
laws that regulate ‘even-handedly’ but nonetheless impose ‘incidental’ burdens on interstate
commerce.”).
167
Id. (internal citations omitted).
168
Id. at 773–74.
169
Id. at 766.
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First, the public corporation ban had a disparate impact on interstate commerce because it protected “Texas-owned package stores at the expense of potential out-of-state
entrants.”170 To assess disparate impact, the court had to calculate the effects on outof-state companies by determining what the market would have looked like without
the public corporation ban.171 The court noted that the effects would be difficult to
measure because Texas enforced an unconstitutional residency requirement on outof-state companies prior to the enactment of the public corporation ban.172 Therefore,
it was difficult to determine what the market would have looked like because out-ofstate actors were prohibited from entering the market.173 The court then used Texas’s
beer and wine market as a comparison.174 About ninety-eight percent of package stores
were wholly Texas-owned, while the beer and wine market, untouched by the ban,
was significantly served by out-of-state companies.175 Using this comparison, the
court found a disparate impact on out-of-state companies and moved to the second
Pike balancing step.176
In the second step, the court determined that the ban served a legitimate local purpose and produced some putative local benefits.177 The legitimate local purpose and
benefits are determined through a rational basis–like inquiry that gives great deference
to lawmakers.178 The court found a “conceivable relationship” between Texas’s legitimate interest in reducing liquor consumption and the public corporation ban.179 Relying
on the conceivable relationship, the court moved to the final Pike balancing step.180
In the third and final Pike step, the court determined that the ban’s burdens on
interstate commerce were “clearly excessive” in comparison to any local putative
benefits.181 The effects of the ban in keeping out-of-state companies out of the
market for the sake of protecting in-state companies served a heavy burden on
interstate commerce compared to the state’s interest in reducing the consumption
170

Id. at 774.
Id. at 775.
172
Id. at 775.
173
Id.
174
Id. at 774.
175
Id. The public corporation ban in the liquor market acted as a block to a “vast majority
of potential out-of-state entrants from the Texas market, while leaving undisturbed most
potential in-state entrants.” Id.
176
Id. (citing Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n v. Pine Belt Reg’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,
389 F.3d 491, 501 (2004)).
177
See id. at 776.
178
Id. Pike’s second step is like rational basis in giving deference to lawmakers unless the
justification is “wholly irrational in light of its purposes.” See Int’l Truck & Engine Corp. v.
Bray, 372 F.3d 717, 728 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Texas Dept. of Transp.,
264 F.3d 493, 504 (2001)).
179
Wal-Mart Stores, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 776.
180
Id.
181
Id. at 778.
171
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and availability of liquor.182 Therefore, the public corporation ban failed the Pike
balancing test.183
In sum, the district court found the public corporation ban to be a violation of
the Commerce Clause.184 The court determined the ban had a discriminatory purpose
under the Arlington Heights analysis;185 however, it did not have a discriminatory
effect under Fifth Circuit precedent.186 Although there was no finding of discriminatory effect, the ban was nevertheless invalidated because of its disparate impact on
interstate commerce under the Pike balancing test.187
B. The Fifth Circuit Decision
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded the district court’s finding
of discriminatory purpose, affirmed the finding of discriminatory effect, and reversed the finding of disparate impact on interstate commerce under the Pike test.188
Although the Fifth Circuit did not “disturb” any factual findings from the district
court confirming that the ban bars “nearly all potential out-of-state entrants,”189 the
only section of the lower court’s opinion that the Fifth Circuit affirmed “was the
conclusion that the law does not have a discriminatory effect.”190
The Fifth Circuit began its attack on the finding of discriminatory purpose by
reviewing the district court’s four-part Arlington Heights analysis.191 The circuit
court did not methodically walk through the Arlington Heights factors in its critique,
but rather pointed to several district court findings that resembled the factors. First,
the circuit confirmed the district court’s finding of a clear history of discrimination.192 Second, the circuit claimed the district court erred in finding “direct evidence
of a purpose to discriminate against interstate commerce.”193 The Fifth Circuit
argued that statements made by legislators were taken out of context and therefore
did not meaningfully link the Legislature to the purpose of discrimination.194 For
example, the circuit argued Senator Kenneth Armbrister’s statement that “you can’t
182

Id. at 777. Texas had other methods of controlling liquor consumption than the public
corporation ban like permit limits and excise taxes. Id. at 776–77.
183
Id. at 778.
184
Id.
185
See supra notes 135–50 and accompanying text.
186
See supra notes 157–63 and accompanying text.
187
See supra notes 164–83 and accompanying text.
188
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 945 F.3d 206, 211 (2019).
189
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Wal-Mart Stores, 945 F.3d 206 (2019) (No. 19-1368),
at 11–12 [hereinafter Pet. for Cert.].
190
Id. at 11.
191
Wal-Mart Stores, 945 F.3d at 214.
192
Id. (citing only the enforcement of residency requirements on out-of-state corporations
after the law had been repealed).
193
Id. at 215 (emphasis added).
194
See id.
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have a package store inside a Walmart” was taken out of context merely because he
later agreed with Senator Henderson’s statement that the Texas Legislature “wanted
to have somebody from Texas with a license that you could get ahold of . . . to
enforce the code.”195 Third, the Fifth Circuit found that the district court erred by failing
to apply a “‘presumption of legislative good faith’” when analyzing the sequence of
events that led to the ban’s passage.196 The district court concluded that but for the
Fifth Circuit striking down residency requirements in Cooper, the TPSA and Legislature would not have enacted the public corporation ban.197 The Fifth Circuit believed
the district court’s analysis of events did not give the Texas Legislature the appropriate
“presumption of legislative good faith” required by Supreme Court precedent.198 Lastly,
the Fifth Circuit gave a blanket claim that “[t]he district court committed errors in its
findings with respect to the other Arlington factors” and that the appropriate response was to “remand the discriminatory purpose issue for reconsideration.”199
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that because the ban was for all public corporations,
regardless of domicile, the ban did not have a discriminatory effect or burden on
interstate commerce.200 The court reached this holding by applying a line of precedent stemming from Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland201 that controls “facially
neutral statute[s] that ban[] particular companies from the retail market.”202 The
Fifth Circuit believed Exxon and its progeny created an exception for the discriminatory effects tests for facially neutral laws that regulated similarly situated companies.203
Applying this reasoning, the court concluded that the ban did not have a discriminatory
effect because both in-state and out-of-state corporations were banned.204
Further, the Fifth Circuit determined that the district court erred by finding a
burden on interstate commerce under the Pike test.205 Wal-Mart argued that controlling
case law allowed Pike to be applied to alcohol regulations “despite the Twenty-first
Amendment.”206 The Fifth Circuit went as far to acknowledge that the “[a]pplication
of Pike in the face of § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment is questionable in light of the
[Supreme] Court’s recent declaration that states ‘remai[n] free to pursue’ legitimate
195

Id.
Id. at 216 (quoting Abbot v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2324 (2018)).
197
Id. at 216.
198
Id.; see Abbot v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2324 (2018) (“[t]he allocation of the burden
of proof and the presumption of legislative good faith are not changed by a finding of past
discrimination.”).
199
Wal-Mart Stores, 945 F.3d at 218.
200
See id. at 220–22.
201
See id. at 218–19 (citing the district court’s use of Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,
437 U.S. 117 (2007); Ford Motor Co. v. Texas Dept. of Transp., 264 F.3d 493 (2001); and
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 495 F.3d 151 (2007)).
202
Id.
203
See id. at 219–20.
204
Id. at 220. Note, this was the same conclusion reached by the district court.
205
Id. at 221.
206
Id. at 221–22.
196
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interests aimed at regulating the ill-effects and risks associated with the alcohol
trade.”207 However, instead of using the Supreme Court’s analysis from Tennessee
Wine, the Fifth Circuit claimed the analysis was irrelevant dicta and then “declared
that the entirety of [the Supreme] Court’s ‘jurisprudence in the area of the dormant
Commerce Clause is, quite simply, a mess.’”208 Thus, ignoring Supreme Court precedent, the Fifth Circuit granted TABC “judgement as a matter of law on Walmart’s
discriminatory effects and Pike balancing claims.”209 The Fifth Circuit repeatedly
noted that the district court gave “too little consideration to the fact that the ban is
facially neutral.”210 However, the Fifth Circuit should have examined the public
corporation ban differently, because an express provision of the statute that gives
special permission to Texas-owned companies to keep their permits makes the ban
clearly discriminatory.211
The Fifth Circuit further argued that the ban failed the Pike balancing test by
claiming “the district court’s analysis overlook[ed] the controlling precedent.”212
The Court reiterated its belief that the Commerce Clause only protects against
discrimination between similarly situated in-state and out-of-state businesses.213 It
believed that the “facially neutral” public corporation ban made in-state and out-ofstate retailers similarly situated because the distinction was made on corporate form,
not corporate domicile.214 Therefore, because the Fifth Circuit found the in-state and
out-of-state retailers to be “similarly situated,” they found no discriminatory effects,
and thus, no Commerce Clause violation.215
In sum, although the Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court’s factual findings, it nevertheless faulted the district court for treating those effects as evidence
of discrimination.216 Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit relied on the ban’s prohibition
on all public corporations as strong evidence that there was no purposeful discrimination from the legislature, despite the fact that an express provision allows for some
Texas-owned public corporations to operate in the state.217
207

Id. at 222 (quoting Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct.
2449, 2472 (2019)).
208
Pet. for Cert., supra note 189, at 13 (citing Wal-Mart Stores, 945 F.3d at 220 n.21).
“Because of the ambiguity in the dicta from Tennessee Wine, we decline to conclude that the
Court meant to alter the discriminatory effect analysis when specifically considering a general
public corporation ban.” Wal-Mart Stores, 945 F.3d at 220 n.21.
209
Pet. for Cert., supra note 189, at 13.
210
Id.
211
See id. at 14–15; TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE § 22.16(f).
212
Wal-Mart Stores, 945 F.3d at 223.
213
Pet. for Cert., supra note 189, at 13.
214
See Wal-Mart Stores, 945 F.3d at 220 (“[T]he public corporation ban treats in-state and
out-of-state public corporations the same. Neither in-state nor out-of-state public corporations
may obtain a P-permit or own a package state.”).
215
Id.
216
Id. at 214–15.
217
Id. at 218.
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III. ARGUMENT
The Supreme Court should have granted certiorari in Wal-Mart Stores to address,
correct, and avoid potential legislative, constitutional, and economic harms stemming from the Fifth Circuit’s decision. The overarching issue in Wal-Mart Stores’
erroneous holding is the Fifth Circuit’s misinterpretation of the public corporation
ban as facially neutral.218 The Fifth Circuit uses “facial neutrality” as a justification
for ignoring recent precedent set by Tennessee Wine and for subsequently misapplying Exxon and its progeny.219 Moreover, the Fifth Circuit’s decision is unequivocally
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Tennessee Wine.220 The
ignorance of this precedent may embolden state legislatures to craft unconstitutional
regulations disguised as facially neutral legislation.221 Lastly, the Fifth Circuit erroneously applied Exxon, thus failing to consider the ban’s practical effects on
interstate commerce and creating a circuit split.222 The Supreme Court should have
“taken a shot” on Wal-Mart Stores to address potential harms stemming from the
Fifth Circuit’s decision.
A. The Issue of Facial Neutrality
The overarching issue in Wal-Mart Stores’ erroneous holding is the Fifth Circuit’s misinterpretation of the public corporation ban as facially neutral. The reliance
placed on facial neutrality allowed the Fifth Circuit to circumvent Tennessee Wine
and apply their own misinterpreted line of case precedent that is erroneous and
creates a circuit split.223 However, the public corporation ban is not facially neutral,
as an express clause224 allows for some Texas-only corporations to hold the P-Permit
at issue.225 The provision allows for corporations that obtained a P-Permit before
1995 to continue using their permits.226 Without context, the provision does not
appear discriminatory, however, Texas enforced durational residency requirements
218

See discussion infra Section III.A.
See discussion infra Section III.A.
220
See discussion infra Section III.B.
221
See discussion infra Section III.B.
222
See discussion infra Section III.C.
223
See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 945 F.3d 206, 214
(5th Cir. 2019).
224
TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE § 22.16(f). The cases, petitions, and amicus curiae briefs refer
to this provision as the “grandfather clause.” The author of this Note recognizes the loaded
racial and historical underpinnings of that phrase and therefore only uses the term for clarity
and consistency with the statutory text and precedent case law. For these reasons, “grandfather
clause” will only appear as quoted language throughout this section.
225
See Wal-Mart Stores, 945 F.3d at 217 n.10; see also TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE § 22.16(f).
226
TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE § 22.16(f).
219
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to obtain P-Permits until 2007, so only Texas-owned companies are saved by
§ 22.16(f).227
The “grandfather clause” provides an exception for some Texas-owned companies that is unavailable to corporations from other states.228 Therefore, the public
corporation ban “explicitly creates the same protectionist effect that Tennessee’s law
implicitly created.”229 Perhaps knowing § 22.16(f) would be detrimental to upholding the ban, the Fifth Circuit addressed the provision only once—in a footnote.230
In the footnote, the court admitted: “Because Texas enforced durational residency
requirements for package store owners until 2007, the exempted corporations are
Texas-based firms. This clause arguably provides some evidence of an effort by the
Legislature to benefit in-state corporations, which the court can consider along with
other evidence in this case.”231
Yet, the Fifth Circuit never addressed the provision again in its opinion.232 The
omission of discussion surrounding the “grandfather clause” undermines the court’s
reasoning and led to an inaccurate finding of facial neutrality.233 Moreover, the
TABC argued Wal-Mart did not properly alert the court to the factual details behind
§ 22.16(f).234 The TABC that preceded the public corporation ban.235 Therefore,
regardl asserted that only 2 of 1,765 companies had been granted an exception under
the clause, and therefore, it “has no real-world impact on the Texas liquor market.”236
While this argument may hold some merit, it ultimately fails. For one, the Fifth
Circuit did not address § 22.16(f) when analyzing the ban’s discriminatory effects.237
More importantly, the provision implicates the unconstitutionally discriminatory
regime ess of its impact, it should be deemed unconstitutional because it is facially
discriminatory.238 The Fifth Circuit relies on the facial neutrality of the public corporation ban for its ignorance of Tennessee Wine and its application of Exxon.
227

Brief for CATO Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5, Wal-Mart
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228
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Pet. for Cert., supra note 189, at 16.
230
See CATO Brief, supra note 227, at 6; Wal-Mart Stores, 945 F.3d at 217 n.10.
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Wal-Mart Stores, 945 F.3d at 217 n.10.
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See CATO Brief, supra note 227, at 6.
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See id.
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Brief of Respondent Texas Package Stores Association in Opposition at 2, Wal-Mart
Stores, 945 F.3d 206 (2019) (No. 19-1368) [hereinafter Brief of Respondent].
235
See id.; see also Wal-Mart Stores, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 759 (“[C]redible evidence shows
that the public corporation ban was enacted in response to a successful dormant Commerce
Clause challenge to . . . a residency requirement that restricted alcoholic-beverage permits
to Texas residents and to firms majority-owned by Texans.”).
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Id. at 2, 13.
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See CATO Brief, supra note 227, at 6.
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B. The Supreme Court Should Have Granted Certiorari to Address the Fifth
Circuit’s Ignorance of Tennessee Wine
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores is unequivocally inconsistent with
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Tennessee Wine.239 The cases are analogous
in their facts and the proper application of Tennessee Wine would have resulted in
a different decision in Wal-Mart Stores. The Fifth Circuit’s blatant ignorance240 of
this case opens the door for state legislatures to violate the Commerce Clause by
crafting “well written” laws to disguise discrimination.241
Just one year prior to denying certiorari in Wal-Mart Stores, the Supreme Court
reiterated the idea that “removing state trade barriers was a principle reason for the
adoption of the Constitution” in Tennessee Wine.242 The Supreme Court did not
solely focus on facial discrimination, but rather, it honed in on whether the purpose
and effect of the legislation was fueled by protectionism.243 The Court invalidated
the two-year residency requirement in Tennessee Wine, concluding the “predominant effect” of the requirement was “simply to protect [in-state retailers] from outof-state competition.”244 The Fifth Circuit abandoned this analysis in Wal-Mart Stores,
replacing it, instead, with repeated insistence that the public corporation ban was
facially neutral and that it was created to reduce the consumption of alcohol.245 Additionally, the TABC argued and the Fifth Circuit found that Wal-Mart Stores was
distinguishable from Tennessee Wine because there “the parties defending the statute
failed to show the statute was anything but economic protectionism, [but] here the
statute’s effect . . . has been shown to be reduced consumption of liquor.”246 However, the cases are analogous and the Fifth Circuit should have applied Tennessee
Wine in Wal-Mart Stores.247
Although both Tennessee and Texas drafted their legislation with the intent to
avoid potential Commerce Clause challenges, the Supreme Court invalidated Tennessee’s legislation in Tennessee Wine, while the Fifth Circuit allowed Texas to keep
the carefully disguised discriminatory law in Wal-Mart Stores.248 The Fifth Circuit
239

See id.
See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
241
See infra note 227 and accompanying text.
242
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(5th Cir. 2019).
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found a lack of direct evidence of purposeful discrimination in the legislative history,
despite explicit commentary made by lawmakers indicating discrimination.249 TABC
argued and the Fifth Circuit found that Texas’s legislative intent was to promote
accountability and “‘track’ package store owners.”250 The circuit court cited the bill
drafter’s admission that “his assignment was to craft a bill which . . . would survive
a [C]ommerce [C]lause challenge.”251 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit quoted the drafter’s
comment that the purpose of the bill was to promote accountability, or at least “have
real human beings who are easily identifiable, who are close to the business, and who
ultimately bear personal responsibility for the actions of the package store.”252 These
facts mirror Tennessee Wine.253 Upon recognizing a potential Commerce Clause
challenge, the Tennessee General Assembly amended their law to include a statement of legislative intent citing better control, oversight, and accountability as the
law’s purpose.254 Moreover, like the TABC, the Association argued local ownership
would lead to the responsible sale and consumption of alcohol.255 The Supreme
Court found both arguments unpersuasive.256 First, little evidence could be offered
to support the claim that local ownership would be conducive to increased responsibility and decreased consumption because it was highly unlikely that the permit
holder would be the same person as the clerk responsible for sales and store
duties.257 Second, monitoring and control are not dependent on local ownership because advancements in technology have made the monitoring and oversight of liquor
stores relatively easy and accessible.258 Had the Fifth Circuit applied Tennessee
Wine, it could not have found a lack of direct evidence of discriminatory purpose.
Next, the sequence of events leading to the ratification of the public corporation
ban clearly demonstrated discrimination259 and the ban likely would have been
invalidated if Tennessee Wine was properly applied. In Wal-Mart Stores, the Texas
249

Wal-Mart Stores, 945 F.3d at 215. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage
Comm’n, 313 F. Supp. 3d 751, 761–62 (W.D. Tex. 2018) (Sen. Armbrister supported the ban
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package store.” He further noted that the Texas legislature “wanted to have somebody from
Texas with the license.”).
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See Wal-Mart Stores, 945 F.3d at 215.
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See id.
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See Tennessee Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2458, 2476.
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See id. at 2458.
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Id. at 2475–76.
256
See id. at 2476.
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See id.
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See id. at 2475 (citing Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 125 (2005)). The monitoring
and control argument especially failed when applied to stores physically located in a state
because inspections and audits could easily be conducted. Id.
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767–68 (W.D. Tex. 2018).
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Legislature passed the public corporation ban in response to the Fifth Circuit’s
declaration that residency requirements were unconstitutional.260 If Tennessee were
to respond to the Supreme Court’s decision in Tennessee Wine by replacing the
residency requirement with a flat ban on public corporations, the law would likely
be invalidated.261 The Commerce Clause inquiry looks to the challenged law’s actual
purpose and effect.262 Enacting a flat ban on public corporations to achieve the same
effects as residency requirements clearly demonstrates the unconstitutional purpose
and effect of shielding in-state retailers from out-of-state competition.263 Therefore,
replacing residency requirements with a public corporation ban would not stand
under Tennessee Wine.264 Under this reasoning, Wal-Mart Stores should have been
an “open and shut” case.265 Instead, the Fifth Circuit wrote off Tennessee Wine as
“dicta” and concluded that the Texas statute did not have a discriminatory purpose
or effect—despite creating significant barriers to out-of-state actors—simply because
the statute was not facially discriminatory.266
The ignorance of Tennessee Wine bears concern for future legislation and
Commerce Clause challenges, especially in the Fifth Circuit. Lawmakers now have
an easy avenue to craft legislation for unconstitutional, protectionist purposes. So
long as the legislation is crafted to appear facially neutral, it is subject to a different
analysis in the Fifth Circuit.267 Moreover, the disconnect between Wal-Mart Stores
and Tennessee Wine treats the Commerce Clause like a second-class constitutional
restraint and may lead to arbitrary results for challenged legislation.268
Both the Commerce Clause and the Twenty-First Amendment are enumerated
powers in the Constitution.269 The Twenty-First Amendment may only supersede the
Commerce Clause when regulations are made to meet a legitimate state interest that
cannot be achieved through nondiscriminatory alternatives.270 One cannot seriously
support, especially in light of Tennessee Wine, that the public corporation ban was
necessary for regulating the consumption of alcohol or monitoring accountability.
Within the same breath, the TABC argued “[t]his statute is not economic protectionism” because it acts to reduce alcohol consumption “while simultaneously ensuring
260
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that small businesses in small towns throughout Texas can survive in the marketplace without having to compete with large corporations . . . .”271 However, just
because a health and safety measure is purported, does not mean it is sufficient to
overcome a Commerce Clause violation.272 When Tennessee Wine is properly applied, the TABC’s justifications are “implausible on their face.”273 Moreover, when
attempting to justify Texas’s regulation as a health and safety measure, the TABC
claimed Texas wanted to keep out public corporations to minimize alcohol consumption.274 However, Texas’s chosen approach to lowering consumption is to
promote drinking beer and wine, rather than liquor.275 As evidenced in Tennessee
Wine, these are not good enough reasons to enact protectionist measures.
In conclusion, Tennessee Wine should have been applied in the Wal-Mart Stores
decision. The Supreme Court used Tennessee Wine in early 2019 to reiterate the
standard for Commerce Clause challenges to state alcohol regulations.276 Wal-Mart
Stores, a case with analogous facts, was decided merely months later in the Fifth
Circuit, yet ignored the Supreme Court’s analysis.277 The proper application of
Tennessee Wine by the Fifth Circuit in Wal-Mart Stores would have generated
different results. The Supreme Court should have granted certiorari to correct the
Fifth Circuit’s ignorance of Tennessee Wine and set an example for future alcohol
regulation challenges.
C. The Supreme Court Should Have Granted Certiorari to Correct the Fifth
Circuit’s Misapplication of Exxon
The Fifth Circuit erroneously relies on and applies Exxon in Wal-Mart Stores.
The Fifth Circuit has used Exxon to generate a per se rule to circumvent the discriminatory effects test in Commerce Clause cases.278 Moreover, the Fifth Circuit’s use
of Exxon has generated a circuit split. In addition to granting certiorari to address the
Fifth Circuit’s ignorance of Tennessee Wine, the Supreme Court should have granted
certiorari to correct the Fifth Circuit’s use of Exxon and prevent future legislative,
economic, and constitutional harms.
The Fifth Circuit inaccurately relies on Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland
to create an exception for the discriminatory effects test based on distinctions in
271
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corporate form.279 The Fifth Circuit uses the case to conclude that because the Texas
statute does not facially differentiate between business forms, it is irrelevant to test
for discriminatory effects.280 However, the pertinent finding in Exxon was that “the
law did not have a discriminatory effect because it imposed no constraints on a large
swath of out-of-state competitors, not because the constraints it did impose were
facially neutral.”281 Exxon does not treat facial neutrality as a dispositive factor in
its analysis.282 Moreover, Exxon emphasized the importance of recognizing how
statutes treat in-state versus out-of-state interests “in the relevant market.”283 Therefore, Exxon “does not suggest, let alone hold, that a state law that draws distinctions
based on business form had no legally cognizable discriminatory effect.”284 Yet the
Fifth Circuit continues to apply Exxon as if it were an exception that “forecloses
discriminatory effect challenges” to facially neutral laws that ban particular companies from retail markets.285
Tennessee Wine made it clear that alcohol regulations—even for health and
safety—are subject to the usual fact-intensive “scrutiny mandated under the Commerce Clause, not to a per se rule.”286 Contrary to Supreme Court precedent, the
Fifth Circuit created an “arbitrary, formalistic distinction” based on corporate form
through the misapplication of Exxon.287 This distinction was a judge-made rule
designed to advance state protectionism by favoring private companies over public
corporations.288 By advantaging private entities, the Fifth Circuit “incentiviz[es] retailers to manipulate their corporate form to enter [a] restricted market, and motivat[es]
state legislatures to adopt similar laws that advance protectionism.”289 State laws that
discriminate against public corporations undermine the positive economic benefits
provided by these entities.290 Public corporations are crucial employers, innovators,
279
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and investors in the economy.291 The sale of public stock allows public corporations
to create jobs and employ “nearly one-third of the American workforce.”292 Moreover,
public corporations have the tools to retain and properly train their employees.293 For
example, public corporations are motivated by their national reputations to extensively train local employees on “drinking age laws, valid customer identification, and
the recognition of forgeries” in order to maintain “responsible, law-abiding stores.”294
Allowing the Fifth Circuit to continue applying Exxon as a per se rule to differentiate companies based on corporate form is both unconstitutional and harmful.295
The Wal-Mart Stores decision is not the only time the Fifth Circuit has misapplied
Exxon.296 The Fifth Circuit has misapplied Exxon to a number of Commerce Clause
cases—taking the impact of the denial of certiorari in the Wal-Mart Stores decision
outside the realm of mere alcohol regulations.297 The Supreme Court should have
granted certiorari to correct the misapplication of Exxon and prevent further harm
to the Commerce Clause. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit’s misuse of Exxon has created
a circuit split with alcohol regulations and the Commerce Clause more generally.298
The Supreme Court should have granted certiorari in Wal-Mart Stores to address the
circuit splits created by the Fifth Circuit.
The First and Sixth Circuits have applied Exxon to invalidate state liquor
regulations based on discriminatory effects that would have “survive[d] an effects
challenge as a matter of law in the Fifth Circuit.”299 For example, the First Circuit
held that a statute distinguishing the distribution methods of “small” wineries from
“large” wineries was unconstitutional because in its effects the statute discriminated
against large out-of-state wineries.300 Although the statute was facially neutral,301 the
First Circuit stated, “Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment does not exempt or
291
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otherwise immunize facially neutral but discriminatory state alcohol laws . . . from
scrutiny under the Commerce Clause.”302 Applying the discriminatory effects test,
the First Circuit found the statute to be an unconstitutional violation of the Commerce Clause.303 This law would have survived a discriminatory effects challenge
in the Fifth Circuit. In fact, the Fifth Circuit, relying on the facial neutrality of the
law differentiating “small” and “large” wineries (rather than in-state and out-of-state
wineries) would not have inquired into discriminatory effects at all.304 In a similar
vein, the Sixth Circuit invalidated a regulation on small farm wineries that required
in-person purchase for direct shipments because the practical effect of the law discriminated against out-of-state wineries.305 The Sixth Circuit found that the practical
effect of requiring consumers to travel hundreds or thousands of miles to purchase
wine in-person from small out-of-state wineries clearly discriminated against interstate
commerce.306 Once again, the regulation would have survived a discriminatory
effects challenge in the Fifth Circuit. The law was facially neutral in that it only
regulated small farm wineries; therefore, the Fifth Circuit would not have applied
the discriminatory effects test.307 The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Tennessee
Wine should have amended this circuit split.308 However, the Fifth Circuit continued
to apply their judge-made rule that overlooks discriminatory effects in Wal-Mart
Stores.309 The Supreme Court should have granted certiorari in Wal-Mart Stores to
definitively end this circuit split regarding state alcohol regulations.
In addition to a circuit split for alcohol regulations, the First and Eleventh Circuits
have expressly declined to read Exxon in the same manner as the Fifth Circuit for
other Commerce Clause challenges.310 For example, in Cachia v. Islamorada,311 the
Eleventh Circuit refused to read Exxon as a command to ignore the discriminatory
302
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effects of a facially neutral ordinance that prevented the entry of chain restaurants
“into competition with independent local restaurants.”312 The Supreme Court should
have taken the opportunity to correct the circuit split by granting certiorari in Wal-Mart
Stores. The Fifth Circuit’s misapplication of Court precedent is damaging to the
Commerce Clause and threatens future constitutional, legislative, and economic harms.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in Wal-Mart Stores was erroneous, and
frankly, a little confusing. It appears that the Fifth Circuit did everything wrong—it
misinterpreted a discriminatory statute provision as facially neutral, ignored recent
Supreme Court precedent, created an arbitrary per se rule for some Commerce
Clause analyses, and generated a circuit split. Wal-Mart Stores appeared to be a case
ripe for Supreme Court review, yet, certiorari was denied.
While the exact ramifications of the Supreme Court’s decision are hard to
predict, it is clear that the Fifth Circuit needs redirection on their application of Exxon
to prevent future harms to the Commerce Clause. Moreover, denial of certiorari in
Wal-Mart Stores has opened the door for state legislatures to draft around the
Commerce Clause using “facially neutral” language to hide their discriminatory intent.
Encouragement of discriminatory laws that favor in-state actors undermines the very
purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause. The denial of certiorari in Wal-Mart
Stores is brewing up constitutional, legislative, and economic harms. Hopefully, the
Supreme Court will “take a shot” in the future to preserve and clarify the long-standing
interconnection between the Twenty-First Amendment and the Commerce Clause.
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